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Abstract:
Flight crews make positive contributions to the safety of aviation operations. Pilots have to
assess continuously changing situations, evaluate potential risks and make quick decisions.
However, even well trained and experienced pilots make errors. Accident investigations have
identified that pilots’ performance is influenced significantly by the design of the flight deck
interface. This research applies Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) and utilizes the - Human
Error Template (HET) taxonomy - to collect error data from pilots during flight operations when
performing a go-around in a large commercial transport aircraft. HET was originally developed
in response to a requirement for formal methods to assess compliance with the new human
factors certification rule for large civil aircraft introduced to reduce the incidence of design-
induced error on the flight deck (EASA Certification Specification 25.1302). The HET
taxonomy was applied to each bottom level task step in an HTA of the flight task in question. A
total of 67 pilots participated in this research including 12 instructor pilots, 18 ground training
instructor, and 37 pilots. Initial results found that participants identified 17 operational steps
with between two and eight different operational errors being identified in each step by
answering to the questions based either on his/her own experience or their knowledge of the
same mistakes made previously by others. Sixty-five different errors were identified. The data
gathered from this research will help to improve safety when performing a go-around by
identifying potential errors on a step-by-step basis and allowing early remedial actions in
procedures and crew coordination to be made.
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Introduction
For the past half century there has been a steady decline in the commercial aircraft accident
rate. Nevertheless during the last decade or so the serious accident rate has remained relatively
constant at approximately one per million departures (Boeing, 2008). While high levels of
automation in third generation airliners have undoubtedly contributed considerable advances in
safety over earlier jet transport aircraft, new types of error have emerged on these flight decks
(Woods and Sarter, 1998). These types of accident are exemplified in crashes such as the
Nagoya Airbus A300-600 (where the pilots could not disengage the go-around mode after its
inadvertent activation; this was as a result of a combination of lack of understanding of the
automation and poor design of the operating logic in the autoland system); the Cali Boeing 757
accident (where the poor interface on the flight management computer and a lack of logic
checking resulted in a CFIT accident); and the Strasbourg A320 accident (where the crew
inadvertently set an excessive rate of descent instead of manipulating the flight path angle as a
result of both functions utilizing a common control interface and an associated poor display).
Human error is now the principal threat to flight safety. In a worldwide survey of causal factors
in commercial aviation accidents, in 88% of cases the crew was identified as a causal factor; in
76% of instances the crew was implicated as the primary causal factor (CAA, 1998).
The skills now required to fly a large commercial aircraft have changed considerably during
the past three decades, mostly as a direct result of advances in control and display design and the
technology of automation. The pilot of a modern commercial aircraft is now a manager of flight
crew and of complex, highly-automated aircraft systems. The correct application of complex
procedures to manage activities on the flight deck is now an essential part of ensuring flight
safety. Most aspects of flight management are now highly procedurally driven. While pilot
error is without doubt now the major contributory factors in aircraft accidents, a diagnosis of
‘error’ in itself this says very little. It is not an explanation; it is merely the beginning of an
explanation. Dekker (2001) proposed that errors are systematically connected to many features
of a pilot’s tools and tasks and that the notion of ‘error’ itself has its roots in the surrounding
socio-technical system associated with aircraft operations. The question of human error or
system failure alone is an oversimplification. The causes of error are many and varied and almost
always involve a complex interaction between the pilot’s actions, the aircraft flight deck, the
procedures to be employed and the operating environment.
During the last decade ‘design induced’ error has become of particular concern to the
airworthiness authorities, particularly in the highly automated third and fourth generation
airliners. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commissioned study of the pilot-aircraft
interface on modern flight decks (FAA, 1996) identified several major design deficiencies and
shortcomings in the design process. There were criticisms of the flight deck interfaces,
identifying problems such as pilots’ autoflight mode awareness/indication; energy awareness;
position/terrain awareness; confusing and unclear display symbology and nomenclature; a lack
of consistency in FMS interfaces and conventions, and poor compatibility between flight deck
systems. The US Department of Transportation (DoT) subsequently assigned a task to the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to provide advice and recommendations to
the FAA administrator to ‘review the existing material in FAR/JAR 25 and make
recommendations about what regulatory standards and/or advisory material should be updated or
developed to consistently address design-related flight crew performance vulnerabilities and
prevention (detection, tolerance and recovery) of flight crew error’ (US DoT, 1999). Since
September 2007 rules and advisory material developed from ARAC tasking have been adopted
by EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) as Certification Specification (CS) 25.1302 and
with supporting advisory material in AMC (Acceptable Means of Compliance) 25.1302.
Perhaps the true significance of the establishment this regulation is that for the first time, there
is a specific regulatory requirement for ‘good’ human factors on the flight deck. It is an attempt
to eradicate many aspects of pilot error at source. However, such rules relating to design can
only address the fabric of the airframe and its systems so the new regulation can only minimise
the likelihood of error as a result of poor interface design. It cannot consider errors resulting
from such factors as poor the inappropriate implementation of procedures, etc. From a human
factors viewpoint, which assumes that the root causes of human error are often many and inter-
related, the new regulations have only addressed one component of the wider problem. The
design of the flight deck interfaces cannot be separated from the aircraft’s operating procedures.
Complex flight deck interfaces, while potentially more flexible, are also potentially more error
prone (there are far more opportunities for error). Analysis of aircraft accident investigation
reports has suggested that, inappropriate system design, incompatible cockpit display layout, and
unsuitable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are major factors causing accidents (FAA,
1996).
With regard to checklists and procedures various axioms have been developed over the years.
For example, Reason (1988) observed that the larger the number of steps in a procedure, the
greater the probability that one of them will be omitted or repeated; the greater the information
loading in a particular step, the more likely that it will not be completed to the standard required;
steps that do not follow on from each other (i.e. are not functionally related) are more likely to be
omitted; a step is more likely to be omitted if instructions are given verbally (for example in the
‘challenge and response’ format used on the flight deck); and interruptions during a task which
contains many steps are most likely to cause errors. Li and Harris (2006) found that 30% of
accidents relevant to ‘violations’ in military aviation included intentionally ignoring standard
operating procedures (SOPs); neglecting SOPs; applying improper SOPs; and diverting from
SOPs. The figure was higher in commercial aviation, with almost 70% of accidents including
some aspect of a deviation (or non-adherence) to SOPs (Li, Harris and Yu, 2008).
Formal error identification techniques implicitly consider both the design of the flight deck
interfaces and the procedures required to operate them simultaneously. They can be applied at
early design stages to help avoid design induced error during the flight deck design process but
they can also be used subsequently during flight operations to diagnose problems with SOPs and
provide a basis for well-founded revisions. Formal error identification analysis is not new. It has
been used in the nuclear and petrochemical industries for many years. Most formal error
identification methods operate in a similar way. They are usually based on a task analysis
followed by the subsequent assessment of the user interfaces and task steps to assess their error
potential. However, it should be noted that formal error prediction methodologies only really
address Reasons’ skill-based (and perhaps some rule-based) errors within a fairly well defined
and proceduralized context. Hence they can only help in protecting against errors which relate
either to the flight deck interfaces or their directly associated operating procedures.
HET (Human Error Template), developed by Marshall, Stanton, Young, Salmon, Harris,
Demagalski, Waldmann and Dekker (2003) is a human error identification (HEI) technique
designed specifically for application on the aircraft flight deck. Advisory Circular AC25.1309-
1A (FAA, 1988) suggested that the reliable quantitative estimation of the probability of crew
error was not possible. As a result, HET was developed specifically for the identification of
potential errors using formal methods, not their quantification. It was developed as a diagnostic
tool intended as an aid for the early identification of design induced errors, and as a formal
method to demonstrate the inclusion of human factors issues in the design and certification
process of aircraft flight decks. HET has been demonstrated to be a reliable and valid
methodology (see Stanton, Harris, Salmon, Demagalski, Marshall, Young, Dekker, and
Waldmann, 2006; Stanton, Salmon, Harris, Marshall, Demagalski, Young, Waldmann and
Dekker, 2009). It has been benchmarked against three existing techniques (SHERPA –
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach; Embry, 1986; Human Error
HAZOP – Hazard and Operability study, Whalley, 1988; and HEIST – Human Error In Systems
Tool, Kirwan, 1988) and outperformed all of them in a validation study comparing predicted
errors to actual errors reported during an approach and landing task in a modern, highly
automated commercial aircraft. The HET method has been proven to be simple to learn and use,
requiring very little training and it is also designed to be a convenient method to apply in a field
study. The error taxonomy used is comprehensive as it is based largely on existing error
taxonomies from a number of HEI methods but has been adapted and extended specifically for
the aerospace environment.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) analyzed data from 240 member airlines
and found about 50% of accidents in 2007 occurred during the phrases of final approach and
landing, a period which comprises (on average) only 4% of the total flight time. Most pilots are
trained that executing a go-around is the prudent course of action when a landing is not
progressing normally and a safe outcome is not assured. This is best practice but it isn’t always a
straightforward decision (Li and Harris, 2008). Knowing how to execute the go-around
maneuver and being proficient in its execution are extremely important but still more is required.
Pilots must possess the skill and knowledge to decide when to execute a go-around. Many
accidents have happened as a result of hesitating too much before deciding to abort the landing.
This research applies the Human Error Template (Marshall, Stanton, Young, Salmon, Harris,
Demagalski, Waldmann and Dekker (2003) to the retrospective analysis of go-around procedures
in a large commercial aircraft to identify potential areas for improvement in the design of the
SOPs involved.
Method
Participants: Sixty-seven pilots participated in this research including 25 captains and 42 first
officers. Twenty-one pilots had in excess of 10,000 flight hours; 18 pilots had between 5,000
and 9,999 hours; 17 pilots had between 2,000 and 4,999 hours and 11 pilots had below 1,999
flying hours. There were 12 instructor pilots, 18 ground training instructors and 37 pilots with
teaching experience. The age range of participants was between 28 and 60. All participants held
a type-rating for the large jet transport aircraft under consideration.
Description of the task: The first step in this research was conducting a hierarchical task
analysis (HTA) to define clearly the task under analysis. The purpose of the task analysis in this
study was an initial step in the process of reviewing the integration of hardware design, standard
operations procedures and pilots’ actions during a go-around. The task analysis undertaken was
for the go-around on a large, four-engined, inter-continental jet transport aircraft (aircraft X)
Task decomposition: Go-around operations can be considered as the required actions to be
made by a pilot to achieve the associated goal and based on the SOPs. Once the overall task goal
(safely performing go-around) had been specified, the next step was to break this overall goal
down into meaningful sub-goals, which together formed the tasks required to achieve the overall
goal (Annett, 2005). In the task, ‘safely performing a go-around’, this overall goal was broken
down into the sub-goals, for example: 1.1 Press TO/GA Switches; 1.2 Set Flaps Lever to 20; 1.3
Rotate to Go-around Attitude; 1.4 Verify Thrust Increase; 1.5 Gear up; 1.6 Select Roll Mode; 1.7
Select Pitch Mode; and 1.8 Follow Missed Approach Procedures. The analysis of each task goal
was broken down into further sub-goals, and this process continued until an appropriate
operation was reached. The bottom level of any branch in a HTA should always be an operation.
For example, the sub-goal 1.7 Select Pitch Mode was broken down into the following operations:
1.7.1 Select Pitch Mode; 1.7.2 Verify Pitch Mode Annunciation; and 1.7.3 Maintain Proper Pitch
Attitude. Seventeen bottom level tasks were identified in this analysis.
Classifying Modes of Error: HET is a checklist style approach to error prediction utilizing an
error taxonomy comprised of 12 basic error modes. The taxonomy was developed from reported
instances of actual pilots and extant error modes used in contemporary HEI methods. The HET
taxonomy is applied to each bottom level task step in a hierarchical task analysis (HTA) of the
flight task in question. The technique requires the analyst to indicate which of the HET error
modes are credible (if any) for each task step, based upon their judgment (Harris, Stanton,
Marshall, Young, Demagalski & Salmon, 2005. There are 12 basic HET error modes: ‘Failure
to execute’, ‘Task execution incomplete’, ‘Task executed in the wrong direction’, ‘Wrong task
executed’, ‘Task repeated’, ‘Task executed on the wrong interface element’, ‘Task executed too
early’, ‘Task executed too late’, ‘Task executed too much’, ‘Task executed too little’, ‘Misread
Information’, and ‘Others’. A full description of the methodology and all materials can be found
in Marshall, Stanton, Young, Salmon, Harris, Demagalski, Waldmann and Dekker (2003).
The design of evaluating format: These 17 bottom level tasks are broken down into 65
operational items to be evaluated by all participants using a structured questionnaire. The
questionnaire format asked participants if they had ever made the reported error (tick ‘ME’) and
if they also had observed any one else who had made the error (tick ‘OTHER’). It was hoped that
this format would increased the participant’s confidence in being able to report errors. For
example, if they had made the error themselves but had no desire to admit to making the error,
they could tick the ‘OTHERS’ box.
Results and Discussion
Participants responded to items based upon 17 sub-tasks in which each step could include any
one (or more) of 12 different types of human errors (see Table 1). Each sub-task consisted of
operational behaviors for participants to evaluate based on his/her own experience (ME) or if
he/she knew someone who had committed the errors (OTHERS).
Table 1: The Results for the Human Error Modes in Aircraft X when performing a go-around.
Numbers in the cells show percentage (%) of respondents reporting that error mode in
each task step.
There were 19 task steps with a very high percentage of errors during go-around (defined as
being when the average number of errors for both ME and OTHERS was over 40%) - see Table
2. The most common error mode for pilots performing the go-around was ‘Failure to execute’;
the second highest was ‘Task execution incomplete’; the third highest as ‘Task executed too late’
Error Modes
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1.1.1 Press TO/GA Switches 33.93 16.07 7.14 26.79 16.07 7.14 16.07 25.00 1.79 0.00 1.79 3.57
1.1.2 Thrust has advanced 26.79 48.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.36 5.36 10.71 0.00 5.36 8.93
1.2.1 PF command ‘flap 20 42.86 12.50 0.00 5.36 0.00 0.00 3.57 42.86 1.79 1.79 0.00 0.00
1.2.2 PM place flap lever to 20 19.64 14.29 10.71 5.36 0.00 3.57 5.36 19.64 3.57 0.00 0.00 7.14
1.3.1 Verify TO/GA mode annunciation 48.21 26.79 1.79 1.79 0.00 5.36 0.00 8.93 0.00 1.79 12.50 7.14
1.3.2 Rotate to proper pitch attitude 5.36 39.29 3.57 1.79 1.79 0.00 5.36 25.00 35.71 8.93 3.57 1.79
1.4.1
Verify adequate thrust for go-
around
53.57 39.29 7.14 5.36 0.00 0.00 3.57 8.93 1.79 3.57 10.71 3.57
1.4.2 Announce ‘go-around’ thrust set’ 62.50 26.79 0.00 1.79 0.00 0.00 1.79 12.50 0.00 3.57 0.00 0.00
1.5.1 Verify positive rate of climb 32.14 19.64 7.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.79 23.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50
1.5.2 Place gear lever to up 39.29 7.14 5.36 3.57 0.00 1.79 19.64 42.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.93
1.6.1 Select Roll mode 26.79 14.29 14.29 10.71 0.00 8.93 5.36 51.79 0.00 0.00 3.57 3.57
1.6.2 Verify Roll mode annunciation 35.71 23.21 1.79 3.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.86 0.00 3.57 3.57 8.93
1.6.3 Turn into correct track 5.36 28.57 10.71 5.36 0.00 1.79 5.36 41.07 3.57 0.00 0.00 3.57
1.7.1 Select Pitch mode 23.21 26.79 23.21 5.36 0.00 3.57 8.93 50.00 1.79 1.79 3.57 3.57
1.7.2 Verify Pitch mode annunciation 26.79 26.79 3.57 3.57 0.00 0.00 1.79 21.43 0.00 3.57 0.00 10.71
1.7.3 Maintain proper pitch attitude 12.50 46.43 12.50 1.79 0.00 1.79 1.79 21.43 7.14 8.93 3.57 1.79
1.8 Follow M/A Procedure 10.71 50.00 25.00 17.86 0.00 7.14 8.93 30.36 0.00 0.00 12.50 3.57
(see Table 2). The most commonly occurring operational error of pilots when performing the
go-around was ‘forgot to call Go-around Thrust Set’ (average 69.41%); the second highest was
‘not using auto-flight system when available and appropriate’ (average 60.45%); the third most
common error reported was ‘did not engage LNAV mode on time failed to capture’ (average
53.73%).
Table 2: The occurred rates of error break down by detail operational behaviors for Aircraft X
Performing Go-around (shown the average error over 40% for both ME and OTHERS)
Modes of Error Description of Errors Occurred during
Go-Around
Occurrence rate
ME OTHERS AVERAGE
Fail to execute Q5. Failed to check thrust level 38.81% 56.72% 47.76%
Task execute incomplete Q8.Thrust lever were not advanced manually when the
auto-throttles became inoperative
29.85% 53.73% 41.79%
Fail to execute Q9. Failed to command ‘flap 20’ due to pilot’s negligence 25.37% 67.16% 46.26%
Fail to execute Q15. Failed to check whether TO/GA mode was being
activated
44.78% 46.27% 45.53%
Task execute too late Q17. Late rotation, over / under rotation. 46.27% 50.75% 48.51%
Task execute incomplete Q18. No check for primary flight display 26.87% 56.72% 41.79%
Fail to execute Q23. Failed to check go-around thrust setting 53.73% 52.24% 52.99%
Task execute too late Q25. Did not identify and correct speed deviations on time 46.27% 47.76% 47.015%
Fail to execute Q26. Forgot to call ‘go-around thrust set’ 68.66% 70.15% 69.41% (1)
Task execute too late Q27. Did not identify and correct go-around thrust
deviations on time
35.82% 58.21% 47.02%
Fail to execute Q30. Forgot to put the landing gear up until being
reminded
40.30% 59.70% 50%
Task execute too late Q33. Did not engage LNAV mode on time failed to
capture
49.25% 58.21% 53.73% (3)
Fail to execute Q37 Failed to check whether LNAV/ HDG was being
activated
31.34% 64.18% 47.76%
Task execute on wrong
interface
Q39. Mixed up the IAS/HDG bugs on the MCP 34.33% 49.25% 41.79%
Fail to execute Q42. Did not engage VNAV mode on time failed to
capture
44.78% 62.96% 53.37%
Task execute incomplete Q46. No check whether VNAV or FLCH was being
activated
38.81% 56.72% 47.76%
Task execute incomplete Q48. Did not monitor the altitude at appropriate time 38.81% 55.22% 47.02%
Task execute too little Q62 Poor instrument scan 43.28% 55.22% 49.25%
Task execute incomplete Q65. Not using auto-flight system when available and
appropriate.
55.22% 65.67% 60.45% (2)
These 17 bottom level sub-tasks were further evaluated by all participants. For each credible
error identified a description of the form that the error would take was required and the outcome
or consequence associated with the error was determined. The likelihood of the error was
estimated using a very simple scale (low, medium or high) as was the criticality of the error (low,
medium or high). If an error was given a high rating for both likelihood and criticality, the task
step was then rated as a ‘fail’, meaning that the procedure involved should be examined further
and it should be considered for revision (see example given in Table 3). As an example, the
qualitative data relevant to the descriptions and consequences of failing to perform properly the
task step relating to task 1.3.2 ‘Rotate to proper pitch attitude’ (which was assessed as a ‘fail’)
can be found in Table 4.
Table 3: An example of Human Error Template output from Sub-task Step 1.3.2 ‘Rotate to
proper pitch attitude’ for performing a go-around.
Scenario: Go-around at XXX International Airport Task step: 1.3.2 Rotate to proper pitch attitude
Error mode Tick Description Outcome Likelihood Criticality PASS FAILH M L H M L
Fail to execute V Pilot’s incapabilitywhen A/P engaged
A/C not climbing
and speed
increasing
V V V
Task execution
incomplete V
Failed to trim to
prevent excessive
pitch up /failed to trim
to reduce forward
pressure
Not enough climb
rate/speed too high V V V
Task executed in wrong
direction V
Failed to rotate to
target go-around pitch
first or follow F/D
without crosscheck
SPD
Affect go-around
performance
SPD too high/ too
low
V V V
Wrong task executed V
Banking instead of
pitching up
A/C not climbing
but rolling, may
cause wings not
level
V V V
Task repeated
Task executed on wrong
interface element
Task executed too early V Rotate to proper pitchtoo rapidly Airspeed low V V V
Task executed too late V
Rotate to proper pitch
too slowly
Affect go-around
performance may
cause not enough
climb rate
V V V
Task executed too much V Increase pitch too high Airspeed low V V V
Task executed too little V Increase pitch notenough
Not enough climb
rate V V V
Misread information V Misreading pitchattitude
May cause
unstable climb rate V V V
Other
Table 4: The qualitative data containing the descriptions and consequences of the error for sub-
task ‘Rotate to proper pitch attitude’ when performing a go-around.
Many of the errors observed during the go-around show an interaction between procedures
and the design of the flight deck. They are not simply the product or either poor design or
inadequate SOPs alone. For example, the responses to Question 8 (Table 2) suggested that on
many occasions the thrust levers were not advanced manually when the auto-throttles became
inoperative. There could be several reasons for this. For example, when a pilot decides to go-
around, the first step is to press the TO/GA switches that will activate the correct mode of the
autothrust system. However, to control thrust manually, pilots need to press the autothrust
disengage switches. Since the TO/GA switches and autothrust disengage switches are next to one
another, pilots may accidentally press the wrong switch, which would cause the thrust levers not
to advance during the go-around. The following are some related incidents related to the sub-
task of ‘Press TO/GA Switches’, (1) Pilot retried to push the TO/GA switch immediately, aircraft
continued the go-around operation; (2) Pilot failed to press TO/GA switch, aircraft touched down
on the runway due to no go-around thrust and cause hard landing incident; (3) Aircraft became
unstable during approach due to unsuccessful go-around. Aircraft went into incorrect pitch
attitude, either below normal path or climb to high pitch angle attitude; (4) Flight director (F/D)
Scenario：
Performing a Go-around at XXX International Airport
Operational step：
1.3.2 Rotate to proper pitch attitude
Error Mode Description
Frequency
Outcome
Frequency
Fail to
execute
PF’s negligence from surrounding
interference ( 2)
A/C not rotated when manual fly (1)
Pilot’s incapability or system failure when
A/P engaged (2)
Pitch up too late or too fast (3)
Panic (5)
Distraction. Unanticipated go-around (2)
15 Not satisfy the go-around climbing rate /Speed up
too much (2)
Close to TERR (1)
A/C did not climb (3)
Over speed or under speed (1)
No go around pitch (3)
Wrong attitude (3)
Stall (2)
15
Task
execution
incomplete
Not enough pitch (3)
Under/over rotate or rotate at an improper
pitch attitude for go around (1)
PF’s negligence (2)
Did not follow FD pitch (1)
Failed to trim to prevent excessive pitch up
/failed to trim to reduce forward pressure
(2)
Distraction. Unanticipated go-around (2)
11 Not enough climb rate or speed too high (2)
Not satisfy the go-around climbing rate (2)
Climb gradient not enough or lose altitude (1)
A/C over pitch which increase pilot’s workload
(2)
over speed or under speed (1)
No go around pitch (1)
Wrong attitude (2)
11
Task executed
too late
PF’s negligence (2)
Late rotate when go around thrust set (1)
Rotate to proper pitch too slowly (5)
Panic (3)
Pilot’s control input later than pitch change
because thrust advanced (2)
13 Not enough climb rate (1)
Speed up too much (3)
Close to TERR (1)
A/C continue to sink (2)
Affect go-around performance (2)
Wrong attitude (4)
13
did not display go-around pitch because of autoflight display system (AFDS) was not triggered;
it wouldn’t provide correct pitch guidance because pitch mode annunciation did not change to
go-around mode. However, the error data also show a failure to follow the required procedures
in this instance in Question 23 (‘failed to check go-around thrust setting’) which should pick up
the failure of the thrust levers to advance to the appropriate setting. Such confusion of system
interface components is not new. Chapanis (1999) recalls his work in the early 1940’s where he
investigating the problem of pilots and co-pilots retracting the landing gear instead of the landing
flaps after landing in the Boeing B-17. His investigations revealed that the toggle switches for
the gear and the flaps were both identical and next to each other. He proposed coding solutions
to the problem: separate the switches (spatial coding) and/or shape the switches to represent the
part they control (shape coding) enabling the pilot to tell either by looking at or touching the
switch what function it controlled. This was particularly important especially in a stressful
situation (for example, after the stresses of a combat mission, or in this case, when performing a
go-around).
Even experienced, well-trained and rested pilots using a well-designed flight deck interface
will make errors in certain situations. As a result, CS 25.1302 requires that ‘to the extent
practicable, the installed equipment must enable the flight crew to manage errors resulting from
flight crew interaction with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service, assuming
flight crews acting in good faith’. To comply with the requirement for error management (which
is actually closely associated with procedural design) the flight deck interfaces are required to
meet the following criteria. They should:
 Enable the flight crew to detect and/or recover from error; or
 Ensure that effects of flight crew errors on the aeroplane functions or capabilities are
evident to the flight crew and continued safe flight and landing is possible; or
 Discourage flight crew errors by using switch guards, interlocks, confirmation actions, or
similar means, or preclude the effects of errors through system logic and/or redundant,
robust, or fault tolerant system design.
However, many of the procedural errors observed are not direct products of the flight deck
interface. They are mostly errors of omission (a failure to do something). As examples, see
Table 2, questions 5, 9, 15, 23, 30, etc. Some of these errors in the execution of the SOPs could
be mitigated by changes to the aircraft’s interfaces and warning systems (and indeed some are –
for example a speed warning on the landing gear position – question 30; better interface design –
question 39; better mode indication – question 46). These all address the first bullet point in the
previous list, enabling the crew to detect or recover from error. However, many of the errors
listed in Table 2 would not be mitigated by better design (for example questions 48 and 62).
Simplifying or re-distributing the go-around procedures between the flight crew members may,
however, have a beneficial effect as a result of either re-distributing workload (allowing more
time for other tasks, such as monitoring the flight instruments) or reducing the number of
procedural steps each pilot is required to execute (see Reason, 1988).
Both Reason (1990) and Dekker (2001) have proposed that human behavior is governed by
the interplay between psychological and situational factors. The opportunities for error are
created through a complex interaction between the aircraft flight deck interfaces; system design,
the task; the procedures to be employed and the operating environment. It is naïve to assume
that simply improving one component (such as the flight deck interfaces) will have a major
effect in reducing error by considering it in isolation. With regard to the HET methodology
employed (Marshall, Stanton, Young, Salmon, Harris, Demagalski, Waldmann and Dekker,
2003) prior this study it has always been used in a prospective manner to predict design induced
error on the flight deck. This study also demonstrates that it can be used in the opposite manner,
to structure data collection and provide an analysis taxonomy for the retrospective collection of
error data. Looking ahead, the HET methodology can also be applied to prospectively test any
revised SOPs to assess their error potential prior to instigating them, thereby avoiding the
requirement for an error history to develop re-evaluation of the revised procedures is possible.
Conclusion
By the use of a scientific HTA approach to evaluate current SOPs design together with error
analysis, interface layout and operating procedures, the flight safety will be enhanced and a user-
friendly task environment can be achieved. This research utilized the HET error identification
methodology (originally developed to assess design induced error as part of the compliance
methodologies under AMC 25.1302) in a retrospective manner to assess error potential in
existing SOPs when performing a go-around in a large commercial jet transport aircraft. Pilots
committed three basic types of error with a high likelihood of occurrence during this maneuver:
‘Fail to execute’; ‘Task execution incomplete’; and ‘Task executed too late’. Many of these
errors were dormant in the design of the procedures or resulted from an interaction between the
procedures and some aspects of the flight deck design. It is hoped that the implementation of
new human factors certification standards and analysis of associated procedures using a validated
formal error prediction methodology will help to ensure that many of these potential errors will
be eliminated in the future.
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